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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS• AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Defendants claim Plaintiffs1 did not allege "factual 
allegations" to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. Df 
Reply Br p. 35. This is not true. Plaintiffs set forth on page 95 
of their brief some of those factual allegations contained in the 
amended complaint. They include the following factual allegations: 
1. Defendants knew Utah's taxation scheme violated § 111 yet 
continued to represent to Plaintiffs that they need not file a 
claim for refund. R. 92. 
2. Defendants, knowing Utah's taxation scheme was unlawful, 
proceeded to collect taxes from Plaintiffs for the 1988 tax year. 
R. 95. 
3. Defendants, by releasing inaccurate and misleading 
information between March 28, 1989 and April 17, 1989, denied 
Plaintiffs the equal protection, privileges and immunities provided 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States. R.97. 
A clear reading of Plaintiff's amended complaint indicates 
Plaintiffs are seeking relief under § 1983 only for the 1988 tax 
year. Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges the actions committed 
by the individual Defendants in their individual capacities during 
1989 deprived Plaintiffs of their rights, privileges and immunities 
secured by the Constitution for the 1988 tax year. Plaintiffs have 
not made the same allegations against the individual defendants for 
the other tax years. These allegations, presumed to be true for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss, give rise to a § 1983 action. 
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II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO FULL RELIEF UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Section 1983 is the principal vehicle for private enforcement 
of federal law against state officials.1 In Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961), the Court identified the purposes of § 1983 as: 
(1) overriding any state law which conflicted with the remedies 
available under § 1983; (2) providing a remedy when the state 
remedy was inadequate; and (3) providing a federal remedy where the 
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in 
practice. Id. at 173-74. The Court also held that § 1983 
supplements state-created remedies stating that "ftlhe federal 
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need 
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 
Id. at 183. (emphasis added). 
State courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with 
federal courts over § 1983 actions. Martinez v. California, 444 
U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980). Moreover, the United States Constitution 
requires state courts to enforce federal claims such as § 1983. In 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947), the United States Supreme 
Court held that state trial courts generally cannot decline 
enforcement of a federal claim because such a refusal would fly "in 
the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a 
nation" and would disregard the "purposes and effect of" the 
142 USC § 1983 provides in pertinent part: "Every person, who 
under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit and 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
2 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 389. The Court also 
made it clear that "the obligation of states to enforce . . . 
federal laws is not lessened bv reason of the form in which they 
are cast or the remedy which they provide." Id. at 391. (emphasis 
added). 
A. Consistent With The Supreme Court's Recent Holdings, a 
Violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 is Actionable Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
In their reply brief (p. 35) Defendants state that a violation 
of 4 U.S.C. § 111 is not actionable under § 1983 against officials 
who reasonably rely on existing law unless their conduct violates 
a clearly established right. Under the United States Supreme 
Court's holdings, a violation of § 111 is actionable under § 1983. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the coverage of [§ 
1983] must be broadly construed." Golden State Transit Corp. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989), See e.g. . Felder v. 
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); Maine v. Thiboutot, 484 U.S. 1, 4 
(1980). Section 1983 "provides a remedy 'against all forms of 
official violation of federally protected rights.'" Golden State 
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). 
The Court has specifically stated: "As the language of the statute 
plainly indicates, the remedy encompasses violations of federal 
statutory as well as constitutional rights." Jd. at 105. 
The Supreme Court has stated that, in determining whether a 
violation of a federal statute like 4 U.S.C. § 111 is actionable 
under § 1983, only two inquiries are to be undertaken by the trial 
court: (1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a 
3 
federal right; and (2) whether the defendants have proven that 
Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983. Id. See 
also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981). 
1. Plaintiffs have Asserted a Violation of a Federal 
Right. 
With respect to the first inquiry, the Court has explained 
that a federal statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 if 
the statute allegedly violated imposes obligations binding upon 
state officials to either act or refrain from acting in a certain 
manner as opposed to expressing merely a "congressional preference 
for certain kinds of treatment." Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106, 
citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19. 
The decision of Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treas., 489 U.S. 
803 (1989) , leaves no doubt that § 111, from the date of enactment 
of the Public Salary Tax Act, imposed a binding obligation upon 
state officials to tax federal civilian retirees in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion.2 Moreover, it is manifestly clear that 
§ 111 was intended to benefit the Plaintiffs. As noted by the 
Court in Davis, "[s]ection 111 by its terms applies to 'the 
taxation of pay or compensation for personal services as an officer 
or employee of the United States.1" Davis at 808 (emphasis 
2Section 4 U.S.C. § 111 provides in pertinent part that "[t}he 
United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for 
personal service as an officer or employee of the United States . 
. . by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if 
the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee 
because of the source of pay or compensation." 
4 
added). The Court went on to state that the nondiscrimination 
clause of 4 U.S.C. § 111 was designed to prohibit discriminatory 
taxation of "retired federal civil servants." Id. at 809-10. The 
Court emphasized that, while intergovernmental tax immunity is 
based, in part, upon the need to protect the federal governmental 
operations from undue interference: 
[I]t does not follow that private entities or individuals who 
are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their 
dealings with the sovereign cannot themselves receive the 
protection of the constitutional doctrine. Indeed, all 
precedent is to the contrary. 
Id. at 814 (emphasis added). 
2. Defendants Cannot Prove Congress Foreclosed a § 
1983 Remedy. 
Second, when a violation of a federal statute is cognizable 
under § 1983, "the defendant may show that Congress 'specially 
foreclosed a remedy under § 1983' . . . by providing a 
'comprehensive enforcement mechanis[m] for protection of a federal 
right."' Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted). 
Section 111 does not contain any remedial mechanism, let alone a 
comprehensive scheme. Nor do defendants suggest the contrary. The 
"burden to demonstrate that Congress has expressly withdrawn the [§ 
1983] remedy is on the defendant." Id. at 107. "'We do not 
lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 
1983 as a remedy' for the deprivation of a federally secured 
right." Id. quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing 
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987) (emphasis added). Under current 
case law, a violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 is actionable under § 1983. 
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B. Plaintiffs1 § 1983 Damage Claim Against Defendants in 
their Individual Capacity is not Barred by Sovereign 
Immunity or the Eleventh Amendment. 
Defendants have been sued in their individual and official 
capacities. Plaintiffs1 § 1983 damage claim is brought against 
Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs1 claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief were brought against Defendants 
in their official capacities. Defendants argue the State is the 
real party in interest with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 
individual capacity damage claim. Df Reply Bf p. 39. 
Plaintiffs1 amended complaint unequivocally demonstrates that, 
as to their § 1983 damage claim, Plaintiffs seek to impose personal 
liability upon the Defendants as individuals. The state treasury 
will remain unaffected by any judgment against the Defendants in 
their individual capacity, unless the state elects to indemnify the 
officials. 
1. Plaintiffs' § 1983 Damage Claim can be 
Characterized as an Individual Capacity Action Even 
if One Assumes the Defendants were Carrying Out a 
Policy of the State. 
As stated above, Plaintiffs1 § 1983 damage claim only seeks to 
impose personal liability on Defendants. Consequently, any further 
inquiry into the characterization of the § 1983 damage claim as an 
"official" or "individual" capacity claim is unnecessary. However, 
because Defendants claim the individual Defendants are "being sued 
in their official capacities", Df Reply Br p. 38, Plaintiffs will 
address this issue. 
In Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1988), a prison 
inmate brought a § 1983 damage claim against the superintendent of 
6 
a New York State correctional facility for unconstitutional 
confiscation of property. The complained of confiscation was made 
by the state official pursuant to a mailroom policy promulgated by 
the state. The state official argued that the inmatefs action 
could only be characterized as an official capacity action because 
the policy was promulgated by the state as opposed to him 
personally. Therefore, the state official argued that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred recovery. 
The court initially noted that, "[t]he eleventh amendment... 
does not protect [a state official] from personal liability if he 
is sued in his 'individual1 or 'personal1 capacity." Id. at 921. 
The court then addressed the state official's argument as follows: 
[E]ven if [a state official] were to prove that he was merely 
carrying out a policy of the state, he would not be protected 
from personal liability under the eleventh amendment. 
* * * 
As the Supreme Court has noted, 'an agent's liability for 
torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading the 
direction or authorization of the principal. The agent is 
himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even 
directed to commit the tort.' Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 113 
n.23. Accordingly, the Court has consistently held that the 
eleventh amendment does not protect state officials from 
personal liability when their actions violate a federal law, 
even though state law purports to require such actions . . . 
[E]very case before the Supreme Court in which 'under color of 
state law' provisions were invoked 'involved action taken 
either in strict pursuance of some specific command of state 
law or within the scope of executive discretion in the 
administration of state laws.' 
Id. at 921. 
The court went on to point out that none of the authorities 
relied upon in an earlier decision, "stands for the proposition 
that state officials cannot be personally liable for carrying out 
an unconstitutional state policy." Id. at 923. In view of the 
7 
foregoing, the fact Defendants acted under the guise of a state 
taxing scheme does not change the characterization of this suit 
from an individual capacity action. 
C. State and City Taxing Officials are not Entitled to 
Qualified Immunity as a Hatter of Law. 
1. Congress has Preempted Defendants' Affirmative 
Defense of Qualified Immunity Since State Taxing 
Officials were not Accorded the Defense of 
Qualified Immunity in 1871, When § 1983 was 
Enacted. 
Defendants1 discussion regarding qualified immunity 
incorrectly assumes that all government officials, under all 
circumstances, are entitled to claim qualified immunity. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected this premise. Certain 
government officials are entitled to this defense when an action is 
brought pursuant to § 1983, but, state taxing officials are not 
included in this group. 
The United States Supreme Court in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 
131 (1988) , discussed the applicability of the immunity defense in 
actions brought pursuant to § 1983. The Court stated that "[a]ny 
assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil 
rights litigation . . . must be made in light of the purpose and 
nature of the federal right." Id. at 139. The court expressly 
stated: 
Accordingly, we have held that a state law that immunizes 
government conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983 is 
preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation 
takes place in state court, because the application of the 
state immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy.... 
Id. (citation omitted). The Court then recognized that Congress 
has provided some immunities for certain state officials. Id. 
8 
However, state tax officials are not among those state officials 
entitled to claim qualified immunity. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 
(1984), is dispositive on this issue. In Tower, the plaintiff was 
convicted of robbery. Subsequent to his conviction, the plaintiff 
brought a § 1983 suit against the public defender seeking punitive 
damages on grounds the public defender had conspired with various 
state officials to secure the plaintiff's conviction. The 
defendant's motion to dismiss was granted by the district court on 
grounds that public defenders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 
liability. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court's decision and the case came before the Supreme Court. The 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, "[o]n its face § 1983 
admits no immunities." Id. at 920. The court further stated that 
it has recognized that certain officials are entitled to absolute 
or qualified immunity. Id. The Court noted, however, that 
"[s]ection 1983 immunities are 'predicated upon a considered 
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant 
official at common law and the interests behind it."1 Id., citing 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976). See also Pulliam v. 
Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984). The Court stated that an official 
is entitled to claim immunity only if, as a threshold matter, the 
official" was accorded immunity from tort actions at common law 
when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871." Tower, 476 U.S. at 
920. The Court in Tower rejected the defendant's claim of immunity 
9 
stating that "[n]o immunity for public defenders . . . existed at 
common law because there was, of course, no such office or position 
in existence at that time." Id. at 921.3 Like the public defender 
in Tower, state tax officials did not enjoy any immunity at common 
law "when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871." 
The law is well-settled that a party claiming immunity has the 
burden of proving they are entitled to the defense. See Laverne v. 
Corning, 376 F.Supp 836 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), aff fd. 522 F.2d 1144 (2nd 
Cir. 1975) ;4 Yet, Defendants do not claim any court has held that 
state taxing officials were entitled to claim immunity from suit at 
common law when § 1983 was enacted in 1871.5 This court should 
reject Defendants' claim of immunity as a matter of law. 
Even if this court is persuaded that state taxing officials 
enjoyed immunity from suit in 1871, its inquiry is not finished. 
In Tower, the Court stated: "If an official was accorded immunity 
3Accord, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 
(1970) ("In sum, we can discern no 'tradition so well grounded in 
history and reason' that would warrant the conclusion that in 
enacting § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, the 42d Congress sub silentio 
extended to municipalities a qualified immunity based on the good 
faith of their officers"). 
4See also Bauer v. Norris, 713 F2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1983); 
De Vasto v. Faherty, 658 F.2d 859, 865 (1st Cir. 1981); Tanner v. 
Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir. 1985); Alexander v. Alexander, 
706 F.2d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 1983); Cook v. City of Topeka, 232 Kan. 
334, 654 P.2d 953 (1982); McGrath v. State, 312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 
1981). 
5In fact, at the time of the enactment of § 1983, the leading 
tax case was the landmark decision of Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States, 22 U.S. 738, 859 (1824), where the court held that, "[i]f 
the law of the State of Ohio be repugnant to the constitution, or 
to a law of the United States made in pursuance thereto . . . [it 
can] furnish no authority to those who took or those who received 
the [taxes] for which the suit was instituted." 
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from tort actions at common law . . . in 1871, the court next 
considers whether § 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel 
against recognizing the same immunities in § 1983 actions." Tower, 
467 U.S. at 920, citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 424-429. 
Defendants have set forth no explanation as to why the history and 
purpose of § 1983 favor the recognition of qualified immunity in 
this dispute. 
The history and purpose of § 1983 counsel against the defense 
in the present action. The Supreme Court has stated that "the 
central objective of [§ 1983] is to ensure that individuals whose 
federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover 
damages or secure injunctive relief." Felder, 487 U.S. at 139, 
citing Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984). "Section 1983 
accomplishes this goal by creating a form of liability that, by its 
very nature, runs only against a specific class of defendants: 
government bodies and their officials." Felder, 487 U.S. at 141. 
In the instant action, Plaintiffs have been subjected to a 
discriminatory tax in contravention of a federal statute and the 
United States Constitution. In addition, Defendants have 
consistently taken the legal position that, despite Plaintiffs' 
established right to refunds under Utah law and the United States 
Constitution, they will not grant refunds to Plaintiffs even though 
similarly circumstanced individuals are awarded refunds in 
perfectly analogous circumstances. If Defendants are immune from 
suit, Plaintiffs will be deprived of their right of redress under 
§ 1983 for violations of their federal constitutional and statutory 
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rights. 
This is an action in which qualified immunity should not be 
recognized. This case is unlike those where qualified immunity has 
been recognized. This is not a case in which liability is sought 
from an official as a result of violations of vague or complicated 
legal concepts such as "probable cause," or "cruel and unusual 
punishment." This case involves a violation of "the plain 
language" of a federal statute. Davis at 808. 
Defendants compounded this violation by ignoring the mandate 
of Davis and collecting an unlawful tax liability even after the 
announcement of the Davis decision. The well-founded 
justifications underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity will 
be undermined if Defendants are permitted to successfully invoke 
the defense in this case. 
The Tower Court expressly stated that, despite "well founded" 
concerns of the possibility that an official's effectiveness may be 
impaired by the threat of § 1983 actions, the Court does not "have 
a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the 
interest of what we judge to be sound policy." Tower, 467 U.S. at 
922-23. The Court held that: 
It is for Congress to determine whether § 1983 litigation has 
become too burdensome to state or federal institutions and, if 
so, what remedial action is appropriate. 
Id. at 923 (emphasis added). Only Congress has the authority to 
create a qualified immunity defense for state taxing officials. 
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2. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Defendants are not 
Entitled to Qualified Immunity as a Result of Their 
Nondiscretionary, Ministerial Acts. 
Even those officials who are not precluded under Tower, supra, 
from asserting the defense of qualified immunity must satisfy other 
requirements before they can raise this defense. In Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the United States Supreme Court 
held that "government officials performing discretionary functions 
may be shielded from liability for civil damages in a § 1983 action 
by the doctrine of qualified immunity." Id. at 818 (emphasis 
added). As a condition precedent to invoking qualified immunity as 
a defense under Harlow, Defendants must show their conduct was in 
furtherance of a discretionary act. In Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 
183, 196 n.14 (1984), the Court unequivocally stated that, "the 
Court's doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in the 
performance of discretionary, but not ministerial functions." In 
Breault v. Chairman of Bd. of Fire Comm'rs., 401 Mass. 26, 513 
N.E.2d 1277 (1987), the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized the 
defense of qualified immunity "is available, as a threshold matter 
under Harlow, only where the defendant official was 'performing 
discretionary functions.'" Breault, 513 N.E.2d at 1281, citing 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
In the instant action, Defendants suggest they should escape 
liability by claiming that, "The State's reliance on long 
established and unchallenged state law was reasonable. At the time 
the actions complained of took place, they were lawful." Df Reply 
Br p. 36. Defendants apparently are asserting their conduct 
13 
involved no discretion and was, instead, ministerial in nature. 
This was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts in Breault. There, a firefighter brought a § 1983 
action against the defendant chairman of the board of fire com-
missioners seeking damages against the commissioner in his indi-
vidual capacity. The commissioner, like Defendants here, raised 
qualified immunity as a defense. The appellate court affirmed the 
trial court's denial of the defendant's claim of qualified immunity 
on the basis the defendant was acting in a ministerial function 
when he committed the alleged civil rights violation. Breault, 513 
N.E.2d at 1281. The court, in reaching this determination, 
reasoned that the statute upon which the defendant acted in 
pursuance thereof, "mandated" the defendant's course of action. 
Id. at 1282. The court concluded that, "[b]ecause the defendant 
enjoyed no statutory discretionary authority to withhold 
reinstatement, he acted in a ministerial capacity. Immunity was 
properly denied." Id. 
Therefore, accepting, arguendo, Defendants' conduct as 
ministerial, they are not entitled to claim qualified immunity as 
a defense. 
3. As Stated by the Supreme Court in Davis, the Lav 
Violated by Defendants was Both "Settled" and 
"Unmistakable". Therefore, Defendants are not 
Entitled to Claim Qualified Immunity. 
This court should entertain the merits of Defendants' 
qualified immunity defense only if Defendants convince the court 
that (1) state tax officials were accorded the defense of qualified 
immunity in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted; and (2) that Defendant's 
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violative acts were not ministerial in nature, i.e., involved more 
than "minimal discretion". In any event, Defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity since, as the Davis decision itself 
unequivocally states, the rights violated by Defendants in the 
instant action were clearly established. 
(a) The Clearly Established Standard. 
Defendants have misconstrued the degree to which Plaintiffs' 
rights must be established in order for this court to accept the 
defense of qualified immunity. Df Reply Bf p. 35. In Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that an official can be held to violate clearly 
established rights even though the "very action in question" was 
not previously held to be unlawful. Id. at 639. 
As stated in Harlow, "a reasonably competent public official 
should know the law governing his conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
819. Public officials are also charged with knowledge of the 
meanings of federal statutes, see Cole v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 
289 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1961); the contents of federal regulations, 
see FDIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); and applicable state law, 
see United States v. Yeazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 
After the Davis case was issued in March of 1989, Defendants 
stand defenseless to claim they acted reasonably in collecting 
unlawful taxes. Plaintiffs sought §1983 relief for the 1988 tax 
year because the Supreme Court had spoken and Defendants still 
refused to acknowledge and grant to Plaintiffs the "rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of 
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the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whatever argument Defendants 
had prior to March 1989 justifying their position, evaporated when 
the Supreme Court spoke. 
The test this Court should implement is whether or not the 
rights afforded Plaintiffs under 4 U.S.C. § 111 and the United 
States Constitution were clearly established when violated by 
Defendants. The test is not, as Defendants maintain, whether the 
state law under which the Defendants acted was clearly established 
or ever called into doubt. It is, therefore, irrelevant how many 
states had taxing schemes which violated the rights of its 
citizens.6 Even if all fifty states had discriminatory taxing 
schemes like that present in Utah, Plaintiffs1 rights under the 
Constitution and § 111 would be no less clearly established. In 
fact, the conclusion that Plaintiffs1 constitutional and statutory 
rights were clearly established even before the U.S. Supreme Court 
spoke in Davis is supported by the fact that there was no final 
authority which sustained the principle that federal retirees1 
benefits could be discriminatorily taxed. 
6As noted by the United States Supreme Court," . . . where the 
power to tax is not unlimited, validity is not established by the 
mere imposition of a tax." Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 
418. It seems state legislatures and the tax authorities who 
advise them err on the side of parochial interest. An example of 
this is the discriminatory taxing schemes, one of which was at 
issue in ATA, Inc. v. Scheiner, 107 S.Ct. 2829 (1987), relentlessly 
enforced by several states against out-of-state truckers. These 
schemes were not saved by the defense that everyone else is doing 
it. In a similar fashion, the United States Supreme Court knew 
full well that many states were violating 4 U.S.C. § 111 when it 
awarded Mr. Davis retroactive relief because the list appears in 
the decision. See, Davis, 489 U.S. at 822 n.3. (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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(b) As Davis Explained, Plaintiffs' Statutory and 
Constitutional Rights Violated by Defendants 
were Clearly Established. 
This court need look no further than the Davis decision in 
deciding whether or not Plaintiffs1 rights were clearly estab-
lished. Davis is replete with analysis and express language which 
unequivocally states that the law in this area has been clearly 
established. It is significant to note from the outset that it was 
the defendant, the State of Michigan, that attempted to persuade 
the Davis Court to depart from clearly established law. The 
Supreme Court rejected the State's invitation: 
The state offers no reason for departing from this settled 
law, and we decline to do so. 
Davis., 489 U.S. at 815 (emphasis added).7 
The statute Defendants violated, 4 U.S.C. § 111, was enacted 
in 1939 as part of the Public Salary Tax Act. Davis, 489 U.S. at 
810. Davis makes this dispositive statement: 
The overall meaning of § 111 is unmistakable: it waives 
whatever immunity past and present federal employees would 
otherwise enjoy from state taxation . . . of retirement 
benefits . . . paid on account of their employment with the 
Federal Government, except to the extent that such taxation 
discriminates on account of the source of compensation. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court specifically stated that any 
other "hypertechnical reading" of the statute would be "implausible 
at best." Id. at 810-811. Davis did not announce a new principle 
of law. It merely affirmed that § ill, by its plain language, 
'The phrase, settled law, has been interpreted to mean 
"unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 
308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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states that the plaintiff in Davis, like the retirees in the 
instant action, could not be subject to a discriminatory state tax. 
By itself, the Davis decision is sufficient for this court to rule 
that the rights set forth in § ill were clearly established. 
The Davis Court emphasized just how clearly established 
Plaintiffs1 rights are by explaining that the long-standing 
principle of intergovernmental tax immunity, as codified in § 111, 
had its "genesis in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 
579 (1819)." Davis, 489 U.S. at 810. In McCulloch, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the State of Maryland could not 
impose a discriminatory tax on a federal instrumentality of the 
United States. The Davis court further noted that after the 1939 
decision of Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 
(1939) : 
[IIntergovernmental tax immunity barred only those taxes that 
were imposed directly on one sovereign by the other or that 
discriminated against a sovereign of those with whom it dealt. 
Davis, 489 U.S. at 811 (Emphasis added).8 The Davis court stated 
that "the nondiscrimination component of the constitutional 
immunity doctrine has, from the time of McCulloch v. Maryland, 
barred taxes that 'operat[e] so as to discriminate against the 
Government or those with whom it deals.1" Id. at 812. (citations 
omitted). The Court stated that § 111 was drafted "against the 
backdrop" of the Supreme Court's tax cases and, as such, is 
8The Court in Davis makes specific mention of the fact that 
just prior to the adoption of 4 U.S.C. § 111 in 1939 it was 
"unclear whether state taxation of federal employees was still 
barred by intergovernmental tax immunity." Davis, at 811-812. The 
enactment of 4 U.S.C. § 111 resolved this uncertainty. Id. 
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"coextensive with the modern constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity." Id. at 813. 
Moreover, in rejecting Michigan's argument that individuals 
should not receive protection of the constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental immunity, the Court in Davis expressly stated 
that "all precedent is to the contrary." Id. at 814 (emphasis 
added). This statement evidences two crucial aspects in favor of 
finding that the law affirmed in Davis was clearly established. 
First, it shows the existence of case law sufficiently on point. 
The Court lists no fewer than five Supreme Court tax cases dating 
back to 1842 in support of the proposition that federal retirees 
may not be taxed discriminatorily. Id. at 814-815. Second, it 
indicates that the law in this area has been consistent, or in 
other words, that there was no split of authority as to this issue. 
Id. These two points further show why the Court phrased the law as 
"settled."9 
The five Supreme Court tax decisions cited by the Davis Court 
have one consistent theme: whenever a state attempted to place a 
discriminatory tax upon an entity associated with the United 
States, regardless of the basis, the tax was struck down as 
unconstitutional. 
Based upon the "settled rule" espoused in the cases cited in 
Davis, it is inconsistent for Defendants to assert before this 
9The word "settle" is defined as a term meaning "to 
establish." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, in 
stating that the rule affirmed in Davis was "settled," the Court 
has conclusively stated that, contrary to Defendants assertions, 
the rule was clearly established. 
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court that the decision in Davis could not have been foreshadowed. 
Consistent with the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity 
and/or 4 U.S.C. § 111, each and every time a state attempted to 
discriminatorily tax a person or an entity associated with the 
federal government, the Supreme Court invalidated the tax. 
Defendants would have this court believe the Davis decision 
was reached in a vacuum when, in fact, just the opposite is true. 
It was an inevitable and unmistakable conclusion based upon 
existing precedent. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 not only 
gave Congress1 consent to nondiscriminatory taxation of federal 
employees, but also amended the Internal Revenue Code to, for the 
first time, tax compensation for personal service "including 
personal service as an officer or employee of a state, or any 
political subdivision thereof . . . ." Public Salary Tax Act of 
1939, Title I, § 1. The same legislation specified that "[t]he 
terms used in this act shall have the same meaning when used in 
Chapter I of the Internal Revenue Code." , Id. Title II, § 206. 
The term "compensation for personal service" as used in the 
Internal Revenue Code at the time of the adoption of the Public 
Salary Tax Act of 1939 included pensions of retired government 
employees. 
In addition, based upon the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity, state pensions had consistently been excluded from 
federal income taxation under the Internal Revenue Code prior to 
the passage of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939. See T.D. 2831, 
21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 180 (1920) (Treasury Regulation under 
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the Internal Revenue Code defined compensation for personal 
services to include "retired pay of federal and other officers, and 
pensions or retiring allowances paid by the United States or 
private persons.") 
4. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Recover Damages from 
Defendants for their Continued Enforcement of the 
Scheme After the Decision in Davis Was Announced. 
If, arguendo, as Defendants assert, the rule of law was first 
established on March 28, 1989, the date of the Davis decision, the 
individual Defendants are individually liable for their conduct 
after March 28, 1989. 
In Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1984), the court 
reversed and remanded the district court's decision to grant the 
defendant government official summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified immunity notwithstanding the recentness of a United 
States Supreme Court holding. In Arebaugh, the defendant's 
complained of actions that occurred only twelve days after similar 
actions by another official were declared improper by the Supreme 
Court. The Arebaugh court noted that "[t]welve days may well turn 
out to have been sufficient time for someone with a direct interest 
to have learned of, read and digested the [Supreme Court's] 
holding." Id. at 973.10 Here, Defendants had twenty days. The 
court in Arebaugh went on to state: 
Obviously, the office of the Commonwealth's Attorney General 
called upon regularly to represent the agency in which the 
defendants served, had at least a responsibility to currently 
10Here, of course, there is no question Defendants were aware 
of Davis and had analyzed its impact on Utah. See press release 
dated on April 5, 1989. R. 595. 
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keep up to date in the legal area in which the case . . . 
fell. To escape liability, the defendants, with the burden of 
proof reposing on them, had the responsibility to demonstrate 
that there existed a good faith explanation either for the 
failure of those responsible to know of the decision . . 
. or, if those responsible were in fact aware of the decision, 
for the subsequent failure to communicate that knowledge to 
the prison officials. 
Id. at 972.11 Similarly, in Ware v. Heyne, 575 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 
1978) , prison officials were held liable for failing to give a 
prisoner written notice of charges against him in advance of a 
prison disciplinary proceeding. The prisoner's right to advance 
written notice was clearly established in an opinion decided two 
months before the disciplinary proceeding, but the opinion was not 
published in the West Publishing Co. advance sheets until two 
months after the disciplinary proceeding. The court found the 
right at issue was clearly established despite the defendant's 
ignorance of the unreported opinion. The same result was reached 
in Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F. Supp. 1061 (E. D. Pa. 1983), where the 
court held that an alleged illegal search violated clearly 
established law based upon the fact that the Supreme Court had 
decided a case "very much on point" approximately "three weeks 
before the search occurred." Id. at 1065. 
In Missouri, one of the states affected by Davis, the attorney 
general issued a formal opinion on April 17, 1989, advising the 
Department of Revenue that the state's taxing scheme was "invalid 
"it should be emphasized that prior to the Supreme Court's 
holding relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in Arebaugh, the lower 
courts were split on the implicated issue. AreJbaugh, 73 F.2d at 
973 n.3. Here, no such split existed. Davis merely reaffirmed 
"settled law." 
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and discriminatory" and that the monies collected under the scheme 
must be refunded, even for prior years. As such, Defendants are 
not entitled to assert qualified immunity for any taxes collected 
after the Davis decision was announced.12 
5. Defendants have Denied Rights Secured to Plaintiffs 
Under the Laws of Utah and the Constitution of the 
United States in Violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The law is settled that violations of a Plaintiffs1 rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also Hoffman v. 
Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 293 (9th Cir. 1959); R.W. Agnew v. City of 
Compton, 239 F.2d 226, 236 (9th Cir. 1957); French v. Heyne, 547 
F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1976). 
Plaintiffs have a statutory refund right under U.C.A. § 59-10-
529. The term "overpayment" is construed by reference to the 
federal analog found in § 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code. Under 
§ 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code, "overpayments" arising because 
of payment of a tax later held to be unconstitutional are 
recoverable in the same manner as other payments, i.e., recovery 
may be had if a timely claim is filed. Contrary to what 
Defendants1 now implicitly assert, there is no authority which 
suggests, let alone holds, that the Utah legislature has carved out 
an exemption from the unqualified statutory right to refund which 
would enable Defendants, when they so choose, to deny refunds 
because Defendants feel a tax collected in violation of the 
12It is undisputed that this tax liability was not due until 
April 17, 1989. 
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constitution does not have to be given back retroactively. Just 
the opposite is true. In Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 
531 (1947), the Court said: 
[W]e read the word 'overpayment1 in its usual sense, as 
meaning any payment in excess of that which is properly due. 
Such an excess payment may be traced to an error in mathe-
matics or in judgment or in interpretation of facts or law. 
And the error may be committed by the taxpayer or by the 
revenue agents. Whatever the reason, the payment of more than 
is rightfully due is what characterizes an overpayment. 
In the instant case, Defendants have not appealed the trial 
court's ruling that Utah's discriminatory scheme is 
unconstitutional. Moreover, the law is abundantly clear that it is 
these Defendants who are charged with the responsibility to pay 
refunds. See, e.g. U.C.A. § 59-1-210(5) and U.C.A. § 59-10-529(6). 
However, these Defendants have announced and have, in fact, denied 
Plaintiffs' their unqualified refund right otherwise available and 
routinely honored in the case of any other similarly circumstanced 
taxpayer who has "overpaid" his tax. For a discussion of this 
issue directly on point, see Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 111 
S.W.2d 77 (Mo. banc 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 718 (1990). 
The denial of refunds by Defendants in this case violates the 
Supreme Court's declaration of "equality" in Davis, supra, and is, 
in itself, unconstitutional because the result of such a decision 
would be to deny Plaintiffs tax treatment equal to that afforded 
the favored class of state retirees for the tax years 1985 through 
1988. As noted by Justice Bandeis in Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l. Bank. 
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931): 
A taxpayer who has been subjected to discriminatory taxation 
through the favoring of others in violation of federal law, 
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cannot be required himself to assume the burden of seeking an 
increase of the taxes which the other should have paid . . . 
The petitioners are entitled to obtain in these suits 
refund of the excess of taxes exacted from them. 
See also Gosnell Dev. Corp. v. Arizona Dept. of Revenue, 154 Ariz. 
539, 744 P.2d 451, 454 (App. 1987) (a refund of taxes was the only 
remedy available to cure unequal treatment of taxpayers). 
D. Plaintiffs are Not Required to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. 
Defendants have raised as a defense that Plaintiffs are 
required to exhaust administrative remedies. Df Reply bf p.44. The 
law is settled that Plaintiffs in a § 1983 action are not required 
to exhaust administrative remedies. 
1. The Supreme Court has Expressly Stated that Only 
Congress has Authority to Place Exhaustion 
Requirements on a § 1983 Claim. 
In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) , the Supreme Court 
held that failure to resort to administrative procedures may not be 
asserted to bar or restrict a § 1983 action brought in state court. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, holding that § 1983 preempted the Wisconsin Statute. 
Felder, 487 U.S. at 138.13 
The Court ruled: 
[T]he notice provision operates, in part, as an exhaustion 
requirement, in that it forces claimants to seek satisfaction 
15The Felder court expressly rejected the Wisconsin Courtfs 
reliance on its prior decision in Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis.2d 404, 
383 N.W.2d 54, cert, denied. 479 U.S. 918 (1986), which stated that 
"where state administrative remedies are adequate and available, a 
plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim is required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies prior to commencing suit in state court." 
See Felder at 147-148, rev'cr. Felder 139 Wis.2d at 622-23, citing, 
Kramer, 128 Wis.2d at 419. 
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in the first instance from the governmental defendant. We 
think it plain that congress never intended that those injured 
by governmental wrongdoers could be required, as a condition 
of recovery, to submit their claims to the government 
responsible for their injuries. 
Id. at 142. 
The Court saw no reason to suppose Congress contemplated 
plaintiffs who bring a § 1983 claim in state court "could be 
required to seek redress in the first instance from the very state 
officials whose hostility to those rights precipitated their 
injuries." Id. at 147. 
The court noted further: 
These [§ 1983] causes of action . . . exist independent of any 
other legal or administrative relief that may be available as 
a matter of federal or state law. They are judicially 
enforceable in the first instance. 
Id. at 148. See also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) 
(holding that § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to initiating § 1983 actions in 
federal court). 
2. There is No Adequate Administrative Remedy 
Available to Plaintiffs. 
Defendants1 assertion that Plaintiffs should have exhausted 
administrative remedies in pursuing their § 1983 civil rights 
action mistakenly assumes the commission has jurisdiction to 
resolve civil rights claims. 
(a) The State Tax Commission Lacks Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction to Entertain a § 1983 Claim 
Brought Against Defendants in Their Individual 
Capacities. 
Plaintiffs1 § 1983 damage claim seeks recovery from the 
Defendants in their individual capacities. There simply is no 
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statutory authority which confers subject matter jurisdiction upon 
the State Tax Commission to entertain this type of civil rights 
action. 
(b) The State Tax Commission Lacks Authority to 
Declare a Taxing Scheme Unconstitutional. 
It is well established that an administrative agency lacks 
authority to rule on the constitutionality of a statute. See, 
e.g. , 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 48, at 
491 ("The administrative process cannot resolve a constitutional 
attack on a statute, rule or regulation, and it is for the courts, 
and not an administrative body, to determine the constitutionality 
of a statute"). The leading treatise on administrative agencies 
unequivocally states that "we do not commit to administrative 
agencies the power to determine the constitutionality of 
legislation. Only the courts have authority to take action which 
runs counter to the expressed will of the legislative body." 3 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 20.04 at 74 (1985). 
The Supreme Court has likewise held that an administrative 
body can only be expected to entertain issues where the agency 
proceeding involves "no remnant of [a] constitutional question." 
Public Util. Comm'n. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958). 
There also appears to be universal agreement among state courts, 
including Utah, which have squarely addressed this issue that 
administrative agencies lack authority to pass on the 
constitutionality of a statute. See, full argument at pp. 75-79 of 
Plaintiffs1 brief. 
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(c) In Light of Defendants' Predisposition Against 
Granting Plaintiffs' Relief, Resort to 
Administrative Procedures Would Be Futile. 
It is widely recognized that where resort to administrative 
procedures would be futile, such a burden cannot be imposed on a 
party. It is uncontested that the Commission issued a widely 
publicized press release shortly after the Davis decision 
announcing its position with regard to denying refunds under Davis. 
The Commission has never backed away from that position either in 
public or in this litigation. 
In, Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 
P.2d 592 (1964), the court stated, "The question here involved, 
being strictly one of law, is for the courts and an appeal to the 
Board of Examiners would have been futile and useless." See full 
argument in Plaintiffs' brief at pp. 75-79. 
With respect to each claim in the amended complaint, 
Plaintiffs were excused from exhausting administrative remedies by 
specific factual findings made by the trial court. These factual 
findings may only be overturned upon a finding of abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. Defendants have not claimed the 
trial court abused its discretion in ruling there were "indications 
that the Utah State Tax Commission has preliminarily decided that 
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) does not 
mandate refunds in Utah." R. 252. Any resort before the 
Commission would be futile. As stated previously, the Utah State 
Tax Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to vindicate 
Plaintiff's § 1983 damage claims because they are brought against 
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Defendants in their individual capacities. Similarly, the 
Commission lacks authority to declare a statute unconstitutional. 
These factors, standing alone, would be sufficient for a finding of 
futility. They do not, however, stand alone. 
Defendants have summarily denied claims for refunds made by 
members of the putative class. R. 598, 917-925. Moreover, 
Defendants1 counsel have repeatedly asserted that Defendants have 
no legal obligation to pay refunds for any tax year prior to 1989. 
Df Reply Bf p.35. Defendant's counsel are the same attorneys who 
advise Defendants with regard to legal matters at the State Tax 
Commission and who would represent the State of Utah's interests in 
a hearing before that administrative body. These additional 
factors demonstrate that a proceeding before the Commission in the 
instant action would be futile. 
Defendants' assertion that Plaintiffs should exhaust 
administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action is 
misplaced since exhaustion is not required for § 1983 actions and 
because there is no showing the trial court abused its discretion 
in relieving Plaintiffs of any exhaustion requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' appeal should be denied and this matter remanded 
to the trial court for the purpose of issuing an order to the Utah 
State Tax Commission to issue refunds to members of the class, plus 
interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
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A P P E N D I X 
TABLE OF CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL RETIREE TAX REFUND LITIGATION 
IN OTHER STATES (as of 03/28/92) 
TRIAL COURT OR STATE SUPREME U.S. SUPREME 
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY COURT COURT COMMENTS 
AL 
AZ 
AK 
CO 
IA 
KS 
KT 
MO ! 
MI 
Refunds granted per 
state refund statute. 
Partial refunds granted. 
|Refunds granted per 
state refund statute. 
Refunds granted. 
Pending. 
Refunds denied to 
military retirees. 
Received injunction. 
The director of Revenue 
denied refunds as he had 
no authority to declare 
a state law unconstitu-
tional. 
Refunds granted. 
Pending (Court of 
Appeals). 
Pending (Court of 
Appeals). 
Upheld refunds. 
Upheld refunds. 
Affirmed trial court. 
Pending. 
Reversed and granted 
refunds pursuant to 
the state refund 
statute. 
Upheld refunds. 
Petition for Cert, 
filed in 1991. Now 
pending. 
Cert, granted; oral 
arguments heard 
03/04/92; pending. 
Denied Petition for 
Cert. 
Refunds now being 
processed. Claims 
involved only 
military retirees. 
Refunds have been 
paid. 
TRIAL COURT OR STATE SUPREME U.S. SUPREME 
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY COURT COURT COMMENTS 
MT 
MS 
NC 
NM 
NY 
OK 
OR 
SC 
Denied refunds per 
Chevron. 
Refunds granted per 
state refund statute. 
Refunds granted. 
Granted refunds per 
state refund statute. 
Refunds granted. 
State Tax Commission 
denied refunds per 
Chevron - non-retro-
activity. 
Refunds denied. 
Refunds granted per 
state refund statute. 
Affirmed trial court. 
Pending. 
Reversed trial court 
per Chevron analysis. 
No appeal. 
Reversed trial court per 
Chevron. 
Pending. 
Remanded to trial court 
for further proceedings. 
Reversed trial court per 
Chevron analysis -
non-retroactivity. 
Petition for Cert, 
filed. 
Petition for Cert, 
filed. 
Cert, granted, 
vacated and remanded 
06/91 per Beam. A 
second petition for 
cert, was filed in 
03/92 after the 
State Supreme Court 
on remand refused to 
apply Beam; Cert, 
pending. 
Refunds paid. 
Appeal to State 
Supreme Court 
TRIAL COURT OR STATE SUPREME U.S. SUPREME 
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY COURT COURT COMMENTS 
UT 
VA 
WI 
WV 
Refunds granted per 
state refund statute. 
Denied refunds per 
Chevron - non-retro-
activity. 
Pending. 
Refunds granted; misc. 
issues remain. 
Pending. 
Affirmed trial court. 
Appeal on procedural 
issues onlyf remanded to 
trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Cert, granted, 
vacated and remanded 
per Beam. A second 
petition for Cert, 
was filed 11/91; 
Cert, pending. 
LIST OF CITATIONS TO OPINIONS IN FEDERAL RETIREE 
TAX REFUND LITIGATION IN OTHER STATES 
AL Rinehart v. Sizemore. CV-89-704-M (App. B). 
AZ Bonn v. Waddell. TX-89-00050 (Ariz. Tax. Ct). 
AK Pledger v. Bosnik. 811 S.W. 2d 286 (Ark. 1991), petition for cert, filed No. 91-375. 
CO Kuhn v. Colorado. 817 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1991). 
IA McManus v. Iowa. No. C89-179 (N.D. Iowa); Hagge v. Iowa. LA 20859 Linn County. 
KS Barker v. State. 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991), cert, granted, oral arguments were heard 
on March 4, 1991, by the United States Supreme Court No. 91-611. 
KT Gossum v. Kentucky. No. 89-CI-248 (Marshall Cir. Ct.). 
MI Fongerv. Dept. of Treasury. N.W.2d (Mich. Ct. App. 
February 4, 1992). 
MO Hackman v. Director of Revenue. 771 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989), petition for cert, 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 718 (1991). 
MT Sheehy v. Montana. 820 P.2d 1257 (Mont. 1991). 
MS Todd v. Tax Comm'n. No. 139915 and Winstead v. Marx. No. 141652 (Chancery Ct. 
1st Jud. Dist. of Hines County). 
NC Swanson v. North Carolina. 407 S.E. 2d 791 (N.C. 1991), petition for rehearing 
denied. 
NM Burns v. New Mexico. No. SF 89-1314(c)(lst Jud. Dist. Santa Fe County, April 5, 
1990). 
NY Duffy v. Wetzler. A.2d (N.Y. App. Div. January 15, 
1992). 
OK Worrell v. Tax Comm'n. No. DR-46 (Okla. Tax Division). 
OR Nutbrown v. Munn. 811 P.2d 131 (Or. 1991), petition for cert, pending, No. 91-457. 
SC Bass v. South Carolina. 395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990), cert, granted, vacated and 
remanded 111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991); the State Supreme Court issued a second opinion 
and there is now a second petition for cert, pending at the United States Supreme 
Court. 
UT Brumley v. Tax Comm'n. No. 89-0903618 (Utah Dist. Ct). 
VA Harper v. Virginia. 401 S.E.2d 868 (Va. 1991), cert, granted, vacated and remanded, 
111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991), 410 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1991), second petition for cert, pending 
No. 91-794. 
WI Hogan v. Musolf. 471 N.W.2d 216 (Wis. 1991), petition for cert, pending. 
WV Brown v. Mierke. CV90-C-3341 (Circuit Court of Kanawha County). 
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